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Abstract—Participants who had to recall 12 childhood events (a diffi-
cult task) were more likely to infer that they could not remember large 
parts of their childhood than participants who had to recall 4 events (an 
easy task), although the former recalled three times as many events. 
This pattern of results suggests that memory judgments are based on 
the experienced ease or difficulty of recall. Accordingly, the negative 
impact of recalling 12 events was attenuated when participants were led 
to attribute the experienced difficulty to the task rather than to the poor 
quality of their memory. The findings emphasize the role of subjective 
experiences and attribution in metamemory judgments. 
People’s beliefs about memory have been assessed across a 
wide range of domains (see Dixon, 1989, and Herrmann, 1982, for 
reviews). The present research focuses on a topic that has received 
less research attention—the strategies that people use in assessing 
the quality of their memory. For example, suppose you are asked, 
“Are there large parts of your childhood after age 5 that you can-
not remember?” and are offered the response alternatives “yes,” 
“unsure,” and “no” (Ross, 1989). How would you arrive at an an-
swer? How do people evaluate their own memory for a specified 
time period? One possibility is that they focus on how much in-
formation they can retrieve about the specified time period. The 
more information is retrieved, the better their memory presum-
ably is. An alternative possibility is based on the notion of the 
availability heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). When judging 
their memory, individuals may rely on the subjective experience 
of ease or difficulty of recall. If so, they may judge their memory 
as good when recall is experienced as easy, but as poor when re-
call is experienced as difficult. 
Note, however, that the more events people attempt to recall, 
the more likely it is that they experience the task as difficult. In-
dividuals who attempt to recall many events may not realize that 
the experienced difficulty is due to task demands and may instead 
attribute it to the poor quality of their memory. Hence, individu-
als who attempt to recall many events may infer poorer memory 
than individuals who attempt to recall only a few events, despite 
the fact that the former are likely to recall more material. The pres-
ent research tested this paradoxical possibility, which is compati-
ble with previous observations in other domains of judgment. 
For example, Schwarz et al. (1991, Experiment 1) asked some 
participants to recall 6 examples of their own assertive behaviors 
(easy task) and others to recall 12 examples (difficult task). The lat-
ter participants subsequently evaluated themselves as less asser-
tive than the former, despite the fact that they had just recalled 
twice as many assertive behaviors. Confirming the causal role of 
the phenomenal experience of difficulty of recall, this finding was 
not obtained when participants were led to attribute the experi-
enced difficulty to an irrelevant source, such as distracting music 
played to them (Schwarz et al., 1991, Experiment 3). In this case, 
individuals relied on the amount of recall and reported higher as-
sertiveness after recalling 12 rather than 6 examples. As this ex-
ample illustrates, recall tasks render two distinct sources of infor-
mation accessible: the recalled content and the ease with which 
this content can be brought to mind. Depending on which of these 
sources individuals draw on, they may arrive at opposite conclu-
sions (see Schwarz, in press, and Schwarz & Clore, 1996, for a dis-
cussion of phenomenal experiences in judgment). 
The present research extends previous work on the experience 
of remembering (for reviews, see Jacoby, Kelley, & Dywan, 1989; 
Kelley & Jacoby, 1996). This work has typically manipulated the ease 
of retrieval for specific items by some version of a priming proce-
dure and addressed, for example, how retrieval fluency contributes 
to the subjective experience of remembering the item (e.g., Lind-
say & Kelley, 1996; Whittlesea, 1993) and to judgments of truth (e.g., 
Begg, Armour, & Kerr, 1985) or confidence (e.g., Kelley & Lindsay, 
1993). Extending this work, the present study explores how the ease 
or difficulty with which material can be brought to mind in a free 
recall task influences more general metamemory judgments, such 
as “How good is my memory for my childhood?” Moreover, in the 
present study, we did not employ a priming procedure, but manip-
ulated recall difficulty by asking participants to recall either a few or 
many memories from a specified time period, thus pitching the im-
plications of the amount of recall against the implications of the sub-
jective experience of ease or difficulty of recall. 
Specifically, participants were asked to recall either 4 or 12 
childhood events. Whereas the former task is experienced as easy, 
the latter is experienced as difficult. Subsequently, they rated the 
completeness of their childhood memory. We predicted that par-
ticipants would rate their memory as worse after successfully re-
trieving many childhood events than after retrieving a few child-
hood events, in contrast to what the actual number of recalled 
events would seem to imply. 
If obtained, this finding would indicate that participants misat-
tribute the difficulty of the task to the poor quality of their memory. 
To provide a direct test of this interpretation, we informed some of 
the participants who had to recall 12 events that most people find 
this task rather difficult. We predicted that these participants would 
rate their childhood memory as more complete than participants 
who completed the same recall task without information about the 
task’s difficulty. Conversely, we tried to inhibit task attributions by 
informing other participants that most people find it easy to recall 
12 events. We expected these participants to be particularly likely 
to rate their childhood memory as incomplete. Such a differential 
impact of the same recall experience would further support the in-
formative role of recall experiences in memory judgments by dem-
onstrating that the impact of these experiences depends on their 
perceived diagnosticity (see Schwarz & Clore, 1996, for a review of 
related findings in other domains). 
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Finally, we included a condition in which participants rated 
the completeness of their childhood memory before they retrieved 
12 childhood events. The judgments obtained in this condition 
presumably reflected participants’ default assumptions about 
their memory, thus providing a baseline against which the impact 
of recalling 4 versus 12 events could be assessed. 
Following their memory judgments, participants asked to re-
call 4 events were asked to recall an additional 8 events. This pro-
cedure allowed us to ensure that all participants could recall 12 
events and that any differences in their memory judgments did 




The participants were 142 undergraduates at the University of 
Michigan (61% women, 39% men; mean age = 19.9 years). 
Materials and Procedure 
In various settings (before a lecture, in a library), participants 
were randomly given one of five versions of a “memory ques-
tionnaire.” In the 0-events condition, participants were first asked 
about the completeness of their childhood memory: “Regarding 
childhood memory, are there large parts of your childhood after 
age 5 which you can’t remember?” Response options were “yes,” 
“no,” and “unsure” (modeled after Ross, 1989). Next, participants 
were asked to report 12 events that they experienced while they 
were 5 to 7 years old and 8 to 10 years old. They had to report 6 
specific events on six numbered lines for each age period. Finally, 
participants rated their recall experience: “Now we want you to 
think back to the task where you had to write down several differ-
ent childhood events. How difficult was this task for you?” They 
responded on a scale ranging from 1 (very easy) to 7 (very difficult).
In the 4-events condition, participants were first asked to re-
port 4 childhood events (2 for each age period). Next, they were 
asked about the completeness of their childhood memory and the 
difficulty of their recall experience. Finally, the participants were 
asked to report an additional 8 events. 
There were three 12-events versions of the questionnaire. 
In each version, participants were asked to report 12 childhood 
events (6 for each age period). Before the recall task, participants 
assigned to the 12-events/difficult condition were informed that 
“most people find recalling childhood events difficult.” Partici-
pants assigned to the 12-events/easy condition were informed that 
“most people find recalling childhood events easy.” Participants 
assigned to the 12-events/control condition received no information 
about task difficulty. After the recall task, participants were asked 
about the completeness of their childhood memory and the diffi-
culty of their recall experience. 
Results 
Manipulation Checks 
Our manipulation of recall difficulty was successful. Partic-
ipants who had to recall 12 events and received no information 
about task difficulty rated the recall task as more difficult (M = 
3.98) than participants who had to recall only 4 events initially (M 
= 3.00), t(46) = 2.24, p < .05. As expected, the compliance with ex-
perimental instructions was very good, with 91.5% of the partici-
pants retrieving all requested events. To ensure that our analyses 
were based on responses of participants who did not experience 
any failures to retrieve requested events, we excluded from fur-
ther analyses the 8.5% (12) participants who did not report all 12 
events. However, the results of all critical tests are similar when 
all participants are left in the sample. 
Judgments of Childhood Memory
Table 1 shows participants’ responses to the memory ques-
tion. The reports of poor childhood memory increased with the 
number of events recalled: Whereas only 19% of the participants 
who had to recall 4 events reported that they could not remember 
large parts of their childhood, 46% of the participants who had to 
recall 12 events (and received no information about task difficulty) 
did so. The judgments of participants who answered the memory 
question before they retrieved childhood events (0-events condi-
tion) fell in between these extremes (37% “yes” responses). 
The proportions of “yes” responses in the 4-events and 
12-events/ control conditions were compared using contrast anal-
ysis on proportions (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1985). The analyses 
were set up in two ways. One analysis compared “yes” responses 
with “unsure” and “no” responses combined (z = 2.05, p = .04). 
The other analysis compared only “yes” and “no” responses (z = 
2.43, p = .02).
To assess the relative contribution of experienced ease and 
difficulty, we constructed a logistic regression model that treated 
the responses to the memory question as an ordinal level de-
pendent variable (“yes” = –1, “unsure” = 0, “no” = 1), using the 
0-events condition as the referent group. Results confirmed the 
prediction that participants in the 0-events condition would pro-
vide significantly more “yes” responses and significantly fewer 
“no” responses than those in the 4events condition (β = –0.85, p 
= .05). Moreover, they also provided significantly fewer “yes” re-
sponses and significantly more “no” responses than those in the 
12-events/control condition (β = 0.78, p < .05). These findings in-
dicate that experienced ease of recall leads to judgments of better 
childhood memory, whereas experienced difficulty of recall leads 
to judgments of poorer childhood memory, relative to a condition 
in which no experiential information is available. 
We further hypothesized that the impact of a given recall ex-
perience depends on its perceived diagnosticity for the judgment 
at hand. Accordingly, we predicted that participants who attrib-
uted the difficulty they encountered in recalling 12 events to the 
nature of the task would not use this difficulty as diagnostic infor-
mation in assessing the completeness of their childhood memory. 
The pattern of results confirmed this prediction. Without informa-
tion about task difficulty, 46% of the participants who had to re-
call 12 events responded with “yes” when asked if their childhood 
memory was incomplete. In contrast, this was true for only 27% of 
















Table 1. Number and percentage of participants endorsing each re-
sponse category when asked, “Regarding childhood memory, are 
there large parts of your childhood after age 5 which you can’t 
remember?” 
 Response category 
Condition                              Yes                  Unsure                  No 
0 events 11 (37%) 7 (23%) 12 (40%)
4 events 4 (19%) 6 (29%) 11 (52%)
12 events/control 13 (46%) 8 (29%) 7 (25%)
12 events/difficult 7 (27%) 5 (19%) 14 (54%)
12 events/easy 11 (44%) 5 (20%) 9 (36%)
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difficult. Again, two contrast analyses on proportions were per-
formed. One analysis compared “yes” responses with “unsure” 
and “no” responses combined (z = 1.52, p < .12). The other anal-
ysis compared only “yes” and “no” responses (z = 2.13, p < .04). 
Moreover, when participants were informed about the task diffi-
culty, their memory judgments did not differ from the judgments 
provided by participants who had to recall either 4 events or no 
event at all (ps > .30, irrespective of response combination). 
Finally, we predicted that informing participants that most 
people find the task easy would enhance the impact of the diffi-
culty they experienced in recalling 12 events. Contrary to this pre-
diction, however, the responses obtained in this condition did not 
differ from the responses provided by participants who received 
no information about task difficulty (p > .3, for both response com-
binations). Informing participants that other people find the task 
easy may not have added much to the interpretation of their phe-
nomenal experience. In fact, most people are likely to expect that 
they can retrieve a dozen childhood events without much diffi-
culty, thus rendering the task information redundant. Hence, par-
ticipants in the 12-events/easy condition and the 12events/con-
trol condition may have found the experienced difficulty equally 
surprising and diagnostic. 
Discussion
Our results suggest that one’s judgments of memory are influ-
enced by the number of events one is asked to retrieve. Paradoxi-
cally, asking people to recall more events results in lower estimates 
of memory completeness, contrary to what would be expected if 
people based their judgments on the number of recalled events. We 
suggest that this effect reflects the fact that a recall task makes ac-
cessible two distinct sources of information: the recalled content 
and the ease with which this content comes to mind. Depending on 
which of these sources individuals draw on, they may arrive at op-
posite conclusions (Schwarz et al., 1991; Wänke, Schwarz, & Bless, 
1995). Recalling many events is generally experienced as more diffi-
cult than recalling a few events. If people focus on the experienced 
difficulty, and do not take the task demands sufficiently into ac-
count, they may misattribute the experienced difficulty to the poor 
quality of their memory. Consistent with this interpretation, the im-
pact of recall difficulty was attenuated when participants were led 
to attribute it to the nature of the task. 
These results are consistent with related research that high-
lighted the role of phenomenal experiences in memory judgments 
(see Jacoby et al., 1989; Kelley & Jacoby, 1996, for reviews). This re-
search focused on the ease or difficulty with which a specific item 
comes to mind. Extending this work, the present findings demon-
strate that recall experiences not only may influence judgments per-
taining to specific items, but also may influence assessments of the 
quality of one’s memory in general. Moreover, the present manip-
ulations illustrate that the sheer attempt to recall a large amount of 
material may result in inferences of poor memory, even when the 
recall attempt is successful, as was the case in the present study. 
At a general level, our findings contribute to the research on 
the judgmental processes that underlie respondents’ answers to 
questions about their memories (see Dixon, 1989, and Herrmann, 
1982, for reviews). They draw attention to the questions that have 
gone largely unnoticed in this literature: What are the strategies 
that people use in assessing the quality of their memory? Do they 
rely on the number of events that can be retrieved or on the sub-
jective experience accompanying the recall? What is the role of at-
tribution in this process? Our findings also have important im-
plications for clinicians and researchers interested in the validity 
of self-reported amnesia for childhood events following memory 
work (Belli & Loftus, 1994; Belli, Winkielman, Read, Schwarz, & 
Lynn, in press; Ceci & Loftus, 1994; Lindsay & Read, 1994). Our 
findings highlight that reports of poor childhood memory may 
simply reflect the fact that recalling childhood events is more diffi-
cult than people think—leading them to infer poorer memory the 
more events they (successfully) try to recall. 
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